P
P
PQ Reviews
Search…
0.7
Finished Reviews
Retired
Powered By GitBook
Badger Finance 0.7 Process Quality Review
Score: 85%

Overview

This is a Badger Finance Process Quality Review completed on 21/09/2021. It was performed using the Process Review process (version 0.7.3) and is documented here. The review was performed by Nick of DeFiSafety. Check out our Telegram.
The final score of the review is 85%, a PASS.The breakdown of the scoring is in Scoring Appendix. For our purposes, a pass is 70%.

Summary of the Process

Very simply, the review looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
    Here are my smart contracts on the blockchain
    Here is the documentation that explains what my smart contracts do
    Here are the tests I ran to verify my smart contract
    Here are the audit(s) performed on my code by third party experts
    Here are the admin controls and strategies

Disclaimer

This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2021. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.

Chain

This section indicates the blockchain used by this protocol.
Chain: Ethereum, Polygon, Arbitrum
Guidance: Ethereum Binance Smart Chain Polygon Avalanche Terra

Code and Team

This section looks at the code deployed on the Mainnet that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here. This review will answer the following questions:
1) Are the executing code addresses readily available? (%) 2) Is the code actively being used? (%) 3) Is there a public software repository? (Y/N) 4) Is there a development history visible? (%) 5) Is the team public (not anonymous)? (Y/N)

1) Are the executing code addresses readily available? (%)

Answer: 100%
They are available at website https://badger.wiki/addresses, as indicated in the Appendix.
Guidance: 100% Clearly labelled and on website, docs or repo, quick to find 70% Clearly labelled and on website, docs or repo but takes a bit of looking 40% Addresses in mainnet.json, in discord or sub graph, etc 20% Address found but labeling not clear or easy to find 0% Executing addresses could not be found

2) Is the code actively being used? (%)

Answer: 100%
Activity is 260 transactions a day on contract 0x3472A5A71965499acd81997a54BBA8D852C6E53d, as indicated in the Appendix.

Guidance:

100% More than 10 transactions a day 70% More than 10 transactions a week 40% More than 10 transactions a month 10% Less than 10 transactions a month 0% No activity

3) Is there a public software repository? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes
Is there a public software repository with the code at a minimum, but also normally test and scripts. Even if the repository was created just to hold the files and has just 1 transaction, it gets a "Yes". For teams with private repositories, this answer is "No".

4) Is there a development history visible? (%)

Answer: 100%
An astonishing 1059 commits paired with 103 branches make BadgerDAO's development history exceptionally rich.
This metric checks if the software repository demonstrates a strong steady history. This is normally demonstrated by commits, branches and releases in a software repository. A healthy history demonstrates a history of more than a month (at a minimum).
Guidance: 100% Any one of 100+ commits, 10+branches 70% Any one of 70+ commits, 7+branches 50% Any one of 50+ commits, 5+branches 30% Any one of 30+ commits, 3+branches 0% Less than 2 branches or less than 30 commits

5) Is the team public (not anonymous)? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes
For a "Yes" in this question, the real names of some team members must be public on the website or other documentation (LinkedIn, etc). If the team is anonymous, then this question is a "No".

Documentation

This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
Required questions are;
6) Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N) 7) Are the basic software functions documented? (Y/N) 8) Does the software function documentation fully (100%) cover the deployed contracts? (%) 9) Are there sufficiently detailed comments for all functions within the deployed contract code (%) 10) Is it possible to trace from software documentation to the implementation in code (%)

6) Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

7) Are the basic software functions documented? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes
All basic software functions are documented under the "Developer Info" subheading.

8) Does the software function documentation fully (100%) cover the deployed contracts? (%)

Answer: 80%
The most important deployed contracts are covered in the "Developer Info" section of their documentation.
Guidance:
100% All contracts and functions documented 80% Only the major functions documented 79-1% Estimate of the level of software documentation 0% No software documentation

How to improve this score:

This score can be improved by adding content to the software functions document such that it comprehensively covers the requirements. For guidance, refer to the SecurEth System Description Document. Using tools that aid traceability detection will help.

9) Are there sufficiently detailed comments for all functions within the deployed contract code (%)

Answer: 30%
Code examples are in the Appendix. As per the SLOC, there is 30% commenting to code (CtC).
The Comments to Code (CtC) ratio is the primary metric for this score.
Guidance: 100% CtC > 100 Useful comments consistently on all code 90-70% CtC > 70 Useful comment on most code 60-20% CtC > 20 Some useful commenting 0% CtC < 20 No useful commenting

How to improve this score

This score can improve by adding comments to the deployed code such that it comprehensively covers the code. For guidance, refer to the SecurEth Software Requirements.

10) Is it possible to trace from software documentation to the implementation in code (%)

Answer: 60%
Documentation covers some of the BadgerDao code, but almost all functions are non-explicitly traceable to their source code.
Guidance: 100% Clear explicit traceability between code and documentation at a requirement level for all code 60% Clear association between code and documents via non explicit traceability 40% Documentation lists all the functions and describes their functions 0% No connection between documentation and code

How to improve this score:

This score can improve by adding traceability from documentation to code such that it is clear where each outlined function is coded in the source code. For reference, check the SecurEth guidelines on traceability.

Testing

This section looks at the software testing available. It is explained in this document. This section answers the following questions;
11) Full test suite (Covers all the deployed code) (%) 12) Code coverage (Covers all the deployed lines of code, or explains misses) (%) 13) Scripts and instructions to run the tests (Y/N) 14) Report of the results (%) 15) Formal Verification test done (%) 16) Stress Testing environment (%)

11) Is there a Full test suite? (%)

Answer: 100%
Code examples are in the Appendix. As per the SLOC, there is 147% testing to code (TtC).
This score is guided by the Test to Code ratio (TtC). Generally a good test to code ratio is over 100%. However the reviewers best judgement is the final deciding factor.
Guidance: 100% TtC > 120% Both unit and system test visible 80% TtC > 80% Both unit and system test visible 40% TtC < 80% Some tests visible 0% No tests obvious

12) Code coverage (Covers all the deployed lines of code, or explains misses) (%)

Answer: 55%
An audit conducted in August 2021 found 43.78% of Badger Finance's deployed code to be covered. In additon, the Zokyo audit has performed a code coverage test that returned an average of around 55%.
Guidance: 100% Documented full coverage 99-51% Value of test coverage from documented results 50% No indication of code coverage but clearly there is a reasonably complete set of tests 30% Some tests evident but not complete 0% No test for coverage seen

How to improve this score:

This score can improved by adding tests that achieve full code coverage. A clear report and scripts in the software repository will guarantee a high score.

13) Scripts and instructions to run the tests (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

14) Report of the results (%)

Answer: 0%
No test result was found.
Guidance: 100% Detailed test report as described below 70% GitHub code coverage report visible 0% No test report evident

How to improve this score

Add a report with the results. The test scripts should generate the report or elements of it.

15) Formal Verification test done (%)

Answer: 0%
Badger Finance has not undergone a formal verification test.

16) Stress Testing environment (%)

Answer: 100%
Badger Finance launches new vaults with stringent limits for an initial testing period to allow for bugs to be fixed before these vaults are open to the general public. There is also clear evidence of Rinkeby testnet usage at https://github.com/Badger-Finance/badger-system/blob/master/badger-rinkeby.json.

Security

This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document. This section answers the following questions;
17) Did 3rd Party audits take place? (%) 18) Is the bounty value acceptably high?

17) Did 3rd Party audits take place? (%)

Answer: 100%
Four different audits have taken place in the past year, all of which are public, and have been published pre-mainnet launch.
Notes On Audit Reports:
The Zokyo audit found that BadgerDAO was very secure and well-written. The only issue that was underlined in the report was an informational language usage flag in the Badger code. Essentially, they use internal functions for modifier roles in some of their contracts, but they should just use modifiers instead. Overall, Zokyo found nothing that could actively pose a risk to the smart contracts' integrity.
The Haechi audit found several minor and informational issues for the Badger team to work on. Unfortunately, there is no indication as to what the team did to resolve them. The underlined issues include a StakingReward bug where the contract's notifyRewardAmount() function would not check if it received rewards. This could lead to higher rewards for more active stakers, and potentially no rewards for others. In the same contract, another bug includes the notifyRewardAmount() function, where users could potentially be subjected to lower rewards rates. These are the most important findings, and all the other ones touch upon the language use and how it can be optimized.
The audit performed by Defi Yield did not find any issues. Rather, the report's only recommendations were to change the Controller and Sett contracts' governance addresses to "real" governance addresses. This would imply that both of these contracts are not linked to the actual BadgerDAO governance addresses.
The Quantstamp audit report unveiled multiple issues. Several of them were of medium risk, and one of them was high risk. The issue is that most of them, including the high-risk one, are not yet resolved. The high risk issue comprises the fact that the Core Badger contract has unbounded trust in its peaks. Peaks, as defined by the Badger documentation, are any third-party integration within the protocol. The issue here is that these peak contracts are telling the Core contract how many tokens to redeem, mint, or burn without limits or any form of verification. This means that any malicious peak contract could completely mess with the overrall Badger token integrity. As this issue is yet unresolved, this poses a serious problem. All other mentionned issues are either medium, low, or of unknown risk, and mostly affect the Core contract.
Guidance: 100% Multiple Audits performed before deployment and results public and implemented or not required 90% Single audit performed before deployment and results public and implemented or not required 70% Audit(s) performed after deployment and no changes required. Audit report is public
50% Audit(s) performed after deployment and changes needed but not implemented 20% No audit performed 0% Audit Performed after deployment, existence is public, report is not public and no improvements deployed OR smart contract address' not found, (where question 1 is 0%)
Deduct 25% if code is in a private repo and no note from auditors that audit is applicable to deployed code

18) Is the bounty value acceptably high (%)

Answer: 90%
Badger Finance has a $750k active bug bounty program.
Guidance:
100% Bounty is 10% TVL or at least $1M AND active program (see below) 90% Bounty is 5% TVL or at least 500k AND active program 80% Bounty is 5% TVL or at least 500k 70% Bounty is 100k or over AND active program 60% Bounty is 100k or over 50% Bounty is 50k or over AND active program 40% Bounty is 50k or over 20% Bug bounty program bounty is less than 50k 0% No bug bounty program offered
An active program means that a third party (such as Immunefi) is actively driving hackers to the site. An inactive program would be static mentions on the docs.

Access Controls

This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document. The questions this section asks are as follow;
19) Can a user clearly and quickly find the status of the admin controls? 20) Is the information clear and complete? 21) Is the information in non-technical terms that pertain to the investments? 22) Is there Pause Control documentation including records of tests?

19) Can a user clearly and quickly find the status of the access controls (%)

Answer: 100%
The access controls are clearly outlined under the security section of their website.
Notes On Mutability:
The Badger Finance code is clearly upgradeable due to their use of multiple proxies, namely UpgradeabilityProxy, as well as their use of numerous external calls to third-party sourced contracts. The combination of these facilitates implementation upgrades, which is something that is essential for a DAO.
To further optimize this, the initialize() functions is used multiple times throughout the Badger contracts. This allows for an easy way to upgrade a contract, even after a deployment to the mainnet,
In addition, migration is possible due to Badger's proxy structure, which facilitates contract upgrades to newer versions. This can be seen, most notably, in the Sett V1, V3, and V4 contracts due to the imported Upgradeability contracts from the OpenZeppelin library, as well as the presence of interface contracts (Interface contracts allow external contract calls).
Guidance: 100% Clearly labelled and on website, docs or repo, quick to find 70% Clearly labelled and on website, docs or repo but takes a bit of looking 40% Access control docs in multiple places and not well labelled 20% Access control docs in multiple places and not labelled 0% Admin Control information could not be found

20) Is the information clear and complete (%)

Answer: 80%
a) All contracts are clearly labelled as upgradeable (or not) -- 20% -- all important contracts are clearly labelled as upgradeable in a governance proposal, though not all deployed contracts are covered.
b) The type of ownership is clearly indicated (OnlyOwner / MultiSig / Defined Roles) -- 30% -- the ownership is clearly outlined in both the security section of the website and in the previous governance proposal.
c) The capabilities for change in the contracts are described -- 30% -- contract upgradeability is identified in the security pages.
Guidance: All the contracts are immutable -- 100% OR
a) All contracts are clearly labelled as upgradeable (or not) -- 30% AND b) The type of ownership is clearly indicated (OnlyOwner / MultiSig / Defined Roles) -- 30% AND c) The capabilities for change in the contracts are described -- 30%

How to improve this score:

Create a document that covers the items described above. An example is enclosed.

21) Is the information in non-technical terms that pertain to the investments (%)

Answer: 90%
Description of admin controls is in clear and non-technical terms, and relates to user funds' safety.
Guidance: 100% All the contracts are immutable 90% Description relates to investments safety and updates in clear, complete non-software l language 30% Description all in software specific language 0% No admin control information could not be found

How to improve this score:

Create a document that covers the items described above in plain language that investors can understand. An example is enclosed.

22) Is there Pause Control documentation including records of tests (%)

Answer: 40%
The documents mentions a "guardian" capable of pausing the protocol, but there is little elaboration.
Guidance: 100% All the contracts are immutable or no pause control needed and this is explained OR 100% Pause control(s) are clearly documented and there is records of at least one test within 3 months 80% Pause control(s) explained clearly but no evidence of regular tests 40% Pause controls mentioned with no detail on capability or tests 0% Pause control not documented or explained

How to improve this score:

Create a document that covers the items described above in plain language that investors can understand. An example is enclosed.

Appendices

Author Details

The author of this review is Rex of DeFi Safety.
Email : [email protected] Twitter : @defisafety
I started with Ethereum just before the DAO and that was a wonderful education. It showed the importance of code quality. The second Parity hack also showed the importance of good process. Here my aviation background offers some value. Aerospace knows how to make reliable code using quality processes.
I was coaxed to go to EthDenver 2018 and there I started SecuEth.org with Bryant and Roman. We created guidelines on good processes for blockchain code development. We got EthFoundation funding to assist in their development.
Process Quality Reviews are an extension of the SecurEth guidelines that will further increase the quality processes in Solidity and Vyper development.
DeFiSafety is my full time gig and we are working on funding vehicles for a permanent staff.

Scoring Appendix

Executing Code Appendix

Code Used Appendix

Example Code Appendix

1
contract BadgerBridgeAdapter is OwnableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable {
2
using SafeMathUpgradeable for uint256;
3
using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
4
5
IERC20 public renBTC;
6
IERC20 public wBTC;
7
8
// RenVM gateway registry.
9
IGatewayRegistry public registry;
10
// Swap router that handles swap routing optimizations.
11
ISwapStrategyRouter public router;
12
13
event RecoverStuck(uint256 amount, uint256 fee);
14
event Mint(uint256 renbtc_minted, uint256 wbtc_swapped, uint256 fee);
15
event Burn(uint256 renbtc_burned, uint256 wbtc_transferred, uint256 fee);
16
event SwapError(bytes error);
17
18
address public rewards;
19
address public governance;
20
21
uint256 public mintFeeBps;
22
uint256 public burnFeeBps;
23
uint256 private percentageFeeRewardsBps;
24
uint256 private percentageFeeGovernanceBps;
25
26
uint256 public constant MAX_BPS = 10000;
27
28
mapping(address => bool) public approvedVaults;
29
30
// Configurable permissionless curve lp token wrapper.
31
address curveTokenWrapper;
32
33
// Make struct for mint args, otherwise too many local vars (stack too deep).
34
struct MintArguments {
35
uint256 _mintAmount;
36
uint256 _mintAmountMinusFee;
37
uint256 _fee;
38
uint256 _slippage;
39
address _vault;
40
address _user;
41
address _token;
42
}
43
44
function initialize(
45
address _governance,
46
address _rewards,
47
address _registry,
48
address _router,
49
address _wbtc,
50
uint256[4] memory _feeConfig
51
) public initializer {
52
__Ownable_init();
53
__ReentrancyGuard_init();
54
55
require(_governance != address(0x0), "must set governance address");
56
require(_rewards != address(0x0), "must set rewards address");
57
require(_registry != address(0x0), "must set registry address");
58
require(_router != address(0x0), "must set router address");
59
require(_wbtc != address(0x0), "must set wBTC address");
60
61
governance = _governance;
62
rewards = _rewards;
63
64
registry = IGatewayRegistry(_registry);
65
router = ISwapStrategyRouter(_router);
66
renBTC = registry.getTokenBySymbol("BTC");
67
wBTC = IERC20(_wbtc);
68
69
mintFeeBps = _feeConfig[0];
70
burnFeeBps = _feeConfig[1];
71
percentageFeeRewardsBps = _feeConfig[2];
72
percentageFeeGovernanceBps = _feeConfig[3];
73
}
74
75
function version() external pure returns (string memory) {
76
return "1.1";
77
}
78
79
// NB: This recovery fn only works for the BTC gateway (hardcoded and only one supported in this adapter).
80
function recoverStuck(
81
// encoded user args
82
bytes calldata encoded,
83
// darkdnode args
84
uint256 _amount,
85
bytes32 _nHash,
86
bytes calldata _sig
87
) external nonReentrant {
88
// Ensure sender matches sender of original tx.
89
uint256 start = encoded.length - 32;
90
address sender = abi.decode(encoded[start:], (address));
91
require(sender == msg.sender);
92
93
bytes32 pHash = keccak256(encoded);
94
uint256 _mintAmount = registry.getGatewayBySymbol("BTC").mint(pHash, _amount, _nHash, _sig);
95
uint256 _fee = _processFee(renBTC, _mintAmount, mintFeeBps);
96
97
emit RecoverStuck(_mintAmount, _fee);
98
99
renBTC.safeTransfer(msg.sender, _mintAmount.sub(_fee));
100
}
101
102
function mint(
103
// user args
104
address _token, // either renBTC or wBTC
105
uint256 _slippage,
106
address _user,
107
address _vault,
108
// darknode args
109
uint256 _amount,
110
bytes32 _nHash,
111
bytes calldata _sig
112
) external nonReentrant {
113
require(_token == address(renBTC) || _token == address(wBTC), "invalid token address");
114
115
// Mint renBTC tokens
116
bytes32 pHash = keccak256(abi.encode(_token, _slippage, _user, _vault));
117
uint256 mintAmount = registry.getGatewayBySymbol("BTC").mint(pHash, _amount, _nHash, _sig);
118
119
require(mintAmount > 0, "zero mint amount");
120
121
uint256 fee = _processFee(renBTC, mintAmount, mintFeeBps);
122
uint256 mintAmountMinusFee = mintAmount.sub(fee);
123
124
MintArguments memory args = MintArguments(mintAmount, mintAmountMinusFee, fee, _slippage, _vault, _user, _token);
125
bool success = mintAdapter(args);
126
127
if (!success) {
128
renBTC.safeTransfer(_user, mintAmountMinusFee);
129
}
130
}
131
132
function burn(
133
// user args
134
address _token, // either renBTC or wBTC
135
address _vault,
136
uint256 _slippage,
137
bytes calldata _btcDestination,
138
uint256 _amount
139
) external nonReentrant {
140
require(_token == address(renBTC) || _token == address(wBTC), "invalid token address");
141
require(!(_vault != address(0) && !approvedVaults[_vault]), "Vault not approved");
142
143
bool isVault = _vault != address(0);
144
bool isRenBTC = _token == address(renBTC);
145
IERC20 token = isRenBTC ? renBTC : wBTC;
146
uint256 startBalanceRenBTC = renBTC.balanceOf(address(this));
147
uint256 startBalanceWBTC = wBTC.balanceOf(address(this));
148
149
// Vaults can require up to two levels of unwrapping.
150
if (isVault) {
151
// First level of unwrapping for sett tokens.
152
IERC20(_vault).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
153
IERC20 vaultToken = IBridgeVault(_vault).token();
154
155
uint256 beforeBalance = vaultToken.balanceOf(address(this));
156
IBridgeVault(_vault).withdraw(IERC20(_vault).balanceOf(address(this)));
157
uint256 balance = vaultToken.balanceOf(address(this)).sub(beforeBalance);
158
159
// If the vault token does not match requested burn token, then we need to further unwrap
160
// vault token (e.g. withdrawing from crv sett gets us crv lp tokens which need to be unwrapped to renbtc).
161
if (address(vaultToken) != _token) {
162
vaultToken.safeTransfer(curveTokenWrapper, balance);
163
ICurveTokenWrapper(curveTokenWrapper).unwrap(_vault);
164
}
165
} else {
166
token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
167
}
168
169
uint256 wbtcTransferred = wBTC.balanceOf(address(this)).sub(startBalanceWBTC);
170
171
if (!isRenBTC) {
172
_swapWBTCForRenBTC(wbtcTransferred, _slippage);
173
}
174
175
uint256 toBurnAmount = renBTC.balanceOf(address(this)).sub(startBalanceRenBTC);
176
uint256 fee = _processFee(renBTC, toBurnAmount, burnFeeBps);
177
178
uint256 burnAmount = registry.getGatewayBySymbol("BTC").burn(_btcDestination, toBurnAmount.sub(fee));
179
180
emit Burn(burnAmount, wbtcTransferred, fee);
181
}
182
183
function mintAdapter(MintArguments memory args) internal returns (bool) {
184
if (args._vault != address(0) && !approvedVaults[args._vault]) {
185
return false;
186
}
187
188
uint256 wbtcExchanged;
189
bool isVault = args._vault != address(0);
190
bool isRenBTC = args._token == address(renBTC);
191
IERC20 token = isRenBTC ? renBTC : wBTC;
192
193
if (!isRenBTC) {
194
// Try and swap and transfer wbtc if token wbtc specified.
195
uint256 startBalance = token.balanceOf(address(this));
196
if (!_swapRenBTCForWBTC(args._mintAmountMinusFee, args._slippage)) {
197
return false;
198
}
199
uint256 endBalance = token.balanceOf(address(this));
200
wbtcExchanged = endBalance.sub(startBalance);
201
}
202
203
emit Mint(args._mintAmount, wbtcExchanged, args._fee);
204
205
uint256 amount = isRenBTC ? args._mintAmountMinusFee : wbtcExchanged;
206
207
Copied!

SLOC Appendix

Solidity Contracts

Language
Files
Lines
Blanks
Comments
Code
Complexity
Solidity
54
7522
1339
1413
4770
446
Comments to Code 1413/4770 = 30%

Javascript Tests

Language
Files
Lines
Blanks
Comments
Code
Complexity
JavaScript
1
246
26
24
196
6
Python
47
11646
2304
2736
6606
203
JSON
2
227
0
0
227
0
Total
50
12119
2330
2760
7029
209
Tests to Code 7029/4770 = 147%
Last modified 29d ago